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To Thine Own Self Be True: Enforcing
Candor in Pleading Through the Party
Admissions Doctrine
by
SHERMAN J. CLARK*
L A Conflict Between Procedure and Evidence?
Statements of a party, as well as statements of those authorized
to speak on a party's behalf, are generally admissible as evidence
against that party. Such statements, or party admissions, are not
hearsay.' Nor are they objectionable when they are not based on
personal knowledge2 or take the form of an opinion? Reliability-
based limits, such as these, are inapplicable because reliability is not
the basis for the party admissions doctrine. Instead, the doctrine is a
product of the adversarial process. It reflects our respect for free ex-
pression and our awareness of the responsibilities that accompany
that freedom. In one cogent formulation:
[The party admissions doctrine] is a logical expression of the phi-
losophy of the adversarial system and is closely connected with the
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. This paper was given as
part of the Hastings Law Journal Symposium, Truth and its Rivals: Evidence Reform and
the Goals of Evidence Law. I thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal, as well as
Roger Park, for inviting me to participate. I thank Ed Cooper, Jim Duane, Rich Fried-
man, Sam Gross, Rick Lempert, Matthew Miner, and Eleanor Swift for their comments.
1. In particular, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) provides in part: A statement
is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "the party's own statement" or "a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
2. See, e.g., Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Ctr., 588 F.2d 626, 630
(8th Cir. 1978) (holding that with respect to party admissions, there is no "implied re-
quirement that the declarant have personal knowledge of the facts underlying his state-
ments").
3. Lay witnesses may offer only those opinions which are "rationally based on the
perception of the witness and... helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testi-
mony or the determination of the facts." FED. R. EVID. 701. This rule prohibits witnesses
from offering opinions which amount to legal conclusions. Party admissions, however, are
not subject to the "restrictive influences of the opinion rule." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)
advisory committee's note; see also United States v. Porter, 544 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir.
1976).
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personal freedom and responsibility that are part of a life in a free
society: parties bear the lion's share of responsibility for making or
breaking their own cases, and lawsuits are focused inquiries into
personal rights and social responsibility. These ideas make it rea-
sonable to say that one cannot claim that his own statement should
be excluded because it was not made under oath, or subject to
cross-examination, or in view of the trier of fact.... In the end, it
seems fair to put a party at risk that the trier will accord full eviden-
tial force to his own statement unless he comes forward with expla-
nation or counter proof.
4
If parties are to be trusted to speak, they ought to be considered able
to explain.
Statements made by counsel on behalf of a party in the context
of pre-trial pleadings are paradigmatic examples of party admissions
in that they are made "by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject."5 Lawyers engaged in civil litiga-
tion are not merely authorized to make statements on behalf of their
clients, they are hired specifically to do so. Accordingly, the applica-
tion of the party admissions doctrine to pleadings might appear un-
controversial.6 As noted by the Eighth Circuit, however, "[t]he use of
pre-trial pleadings as admissions has been a thorny issue in the law of
evidence."7
It has been argued that to apply the party admissions doctrine to
certain categories of pleading statements would be to compromise
the policies of liberal pleading and amendment embodied in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, it has been maintained
that the admission of such statements can infringe upon the "right"
afforded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e) to plead hypotheti-
cally or in the alternative. I argue, to the contrary, that the very poli-
cies underlying a regime of liberal pleading recommend, if not de-
mand, that most such statements be admissible. By excluding party
admissions from the category of hearsay, the rules of evidence allow
the adversarial system to serve the end, only partially achieved by
4. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.31
(1995) (citations omitted).
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
6. The more apparent controversial issue is the extent to which pleadings should be
given binding effect as judicial admissions rather than merely evidentiary admissions. See
Ediberto Roman, "Your Honor What I Meant to Say Was... ": A Comparative Analysis
of the Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions Doctrines as Applied to Counsel Statements in
Pleadings, Open Court, and Memoranda of Law, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 981, 992 (1995). My
focus here is solely on the evidentiary use of pleadings.
7. Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1157 (8th Cir. 1981).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, of insuring that the opportunity
to plead hypothetically or in the alternative does not operate as an
invitation to plead falsely or without basis in fact. I argue that, in this
way, the application of the party admissions doctrine to pre-trial
pleadings works in conjunction with, and to an extent makes possible,
the liberal notice pleading and amendment provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 15. Thus, I respond to those who
have suggested that liberal pleading rules should serve as reasons for
excluding from evidence many factual statements made in the con-
text of pleading.
As I discuss in Part II, much of the thorniness in the case law and
commentary stems from an apparent failure to think carefully about
what our liberal pleading regime does and does not permit. A com-
prehensive view of the roles played by Rule 8, Rule 11, and the party
admissions doctrine helps to dissipate the conceptual uncertainty
giving rise to the exclusion of pleadings from evidence. In this light, I
argue that the admissibility of pleadings should turn on the familiar
distinction between law and fact. Factual allegations in pre-trial
pleadings should be admitted; legal allegations and statements of le-
gal theories should be excluded.
Before considering the merits of applying the distinction be-
tween law and fact to the context of the admissibility of pleadings, it
is worth addressing the approaches courts have taken with respect to
the admissibility of different kinds of pre-trial pleadings. Although
they have been far from consistent, courts have generally identified
four broad, and often overlapping, categories of pleadings that give
rise to questions of admissibility: 1) amended or superseded plead-
ings; 2) pleadings from prior cases involving the same facts; 3) hypo-
thetical or alternative pleadings; and 4) pleadings in cases involving
third party joinder.
A. Amended or Superseded Pleadings
At least one commentator has suggested that pleadings which
have been amended or superseded should, to the extent that they are
inconsistent with remaining pleadings, be excluded from evidence to
protect the liberal amendment policy articulated in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15.8 Even that commentator has recognized, how-
8. See JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 257 (4th ed. 1992).
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ever, that this approach is not "widely recognized."9 Instead, most
courts hold that the mere fact that a pleading has been amended or
superseded is not sufficient to give rise to any question as to its ad-
missibility. The Second Circuit made the clearest statement on this
matter more than a half century ago:
When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion
ceases to be a conclusive judicial admission; but it still remains as a
statement once seriously made by an authorized agent, and as such
it is competent evidence of the facts stated, though controvertible,
like any other extrajudicial admission made by a party or his agent.
... If the agent made the admission without adequate information,
that goes to its weight, not to its admissibility.'
°
The Second Circuit has more recently made it clear that this
analysis has not been altered by either the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence. " Indeed, the law is
quite clear that such pleadings constitute the admissions of a party-
opponent and are admissible in the case in which they were originally
filed as well as in any subsequent litigation involving that party.' 2 In
this context, the court observed:
A party.. . cannot advance one version of the facts in its pleadings,
conclude that its interests would be better served by a different ver-
sion, and amend its pleadings to incorporate that version, safe in
the belief that the trier of fact will never learn of the change in sto-
ries.'
3
Courts are almost universally in accord on this point. A party cannot
render a pleading inadmissible merely by amending or withdrawing
it.1
4
9. See id.
10. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir.
1929).
11. See United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984).
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to admit inconsis-
tency between amended and original complaints); Sunkyong Int'l, Inc. v. Anderson Land
& Livestock Co., 828 F.2d 1245, 1249 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) ("A pleading abandoned or su-
perseded through amendment no longer serves any function in the case, but may be in-
troduced into evidence as the admission of a party.").
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B. Pleadings from Prior Cases
If pleadings, though amended or superseded, remain admissible
in the trial of the case in which they were filed, statements contained
in pleadings from prior cases ought to be similarly admissible. The
language of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), at least, offers no
grounds for objecting to the admission of such statements. Nor does
the logic of the rule's application to pleadings. Pleadings from prior
cases should remain admissible although they do not "serve any func-
tion in the case"'5 because their status as evidentiary admissions is in
no way tied to whether they have a role in the current litigation. 6
Within this framework, however, courts have varied substantially
in their willingness to recognize the possibility of unfair prejudice
arising out of the admission of pleadings from prior lawsuits. In Vin-
cent v. Louis Marx & Co.,'7 for example, the First Circuit reversed a
district court's decision to admit pleadings from a prior lawsuit where
the district court believed that it lacked discretion to exclude them.
The court observed that inconsistent pleadings from prior cases are
generally admissible, but held that "the initial decision [regarding the
admissibility of prior pleadings] should be left to the discretion of the
trial judge under Fed. R. Evid. 403. " 8 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit,
in Williams v. Union Carbide Corp.,9 appeared reluctant to see the
admission of prior pleadings as potentially problematic. The court
stated:
[W]e can see no unfair prejudice in the admission of the prior alle-
gations. The hiring of an attorney and the filing of a lawsuit are
generally done with considerable thought and care. Absent unau-
thorized conduct on the part of the attorney, there is nothing unfair
about having to explain one's past lawsuits.'3
Some courts have taken an alternative approach. Instead of
adopting a general rule in favor of admissibility, they have held that
allegations contained in pleadings from prior lawsuits are admissible
only when those allegations are logically inconsistent with positions
taken by the pleader in the current litigation . 2 ' The rationale offered
15. See Sunkyong Int'l, Inc. 828 F.2d at 1249 n.3.
16. See, e.g., Walaschek & Ass'n. v. Crow, 733 F.2d 51, 54 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. 874 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1989).
18. Id. at 40.
19. 790 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1986).
20. Id- at 556.
21. See, e.g., Spinosa v. Int'l Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1157 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing
Mar. 1998]
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by courts taking this position is that prior pleadings are irrelevant
unless offered to impeach the pleader by showing inconsistency.22 An
inconsistency requirement based on this logic serves as a proxy for
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and, thus, as a criterion for the admis-
sion of prior pleadings. As I suggest below, this approach overlooks
the possibility that prior pleadings might be relevant not only for im-
peachment purposes, but also as substantive proof.
Although they have adopted different approaches, courts ad-
dressing the admissibility of pleadings from prior cases appear to
agree at some level that the key question is one of prejudice versus
probative value under Rule 403. What the cases lack, however, is a
careful analysis of the nature of the prejudice litigants might face
through the introduction of prior pleadings. What one finds instead
are conclusory statements such as "there is nothing unfair about
having to explain one's past lawsuits,"' on the one hand, or "admis-
sion of them would potentially prejudice the jury,"'24 on the other. As
a result, courts not only miss potential sources of relevance, but more
fundamentally fail to distinguish between unfair prejudice and legiti-
mate impeachment or substantive use.
C. Hypothetical or Alternative Pleadings
In contrast to pleadings from prior lawsuits which are admitted
by some courts only when they show inconsistency, hypothetical or
alternative pleadings tend to be excluded when they are inconsistent
with positions taken at trial. This is particularly true regarding
pleadings which state legal theories, and, in such cases, the more
glaring the inconsistency, the more likely the exclusion. The explana-
tion for this phenomenon is that self-conscious inconsistency on the
part of the pleader highlights and renders obvious the pleader's in-
tent to make use of the permission granted by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(e) to state multiple claims alternatively or hypothetically
"regardless of consistency."' When a party's statements are of a sort
expressly permitted by the procedure rules and are obviously in-
tended to give notice of what legal theories the party intends to pur-
sue rather than to allege facts, it has been thought unfair to allow an
Bellevance v. Nashua Aviation & Supply Co., 104 A.2d 882 (N.H. 1954)).
22. See id.
23. Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 790 F.2d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 1986).
24. Spinosa, 621 F.2d at 1157 n.2.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
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opponent to use those statements against that party.
For example, in Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc.,26 the
Ninth Circuit confronted a case involving three mutually inconsistent
allegations. The plaintiff, in response to the defendant's counter-
claim, had alleged: "(1) no contract existed, (2) course of dealing and
usage of trade permitted it to 'cancel its performance at any time
prior to 30 days before shipment date,' and (3) performance was le-
gally impossible."' 7 The court held that these pleadings should not be
considered evidence in the case:
Such inconsistent pleading is permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(e)(2). Therefore, as the Fifth Circuit has ruled, "one of two in-
consistent pleas cannot be used as evidence in the trial of the other"
because a contrary rule "would place a litigant at his peril in exer-
cising the liberal pleading... provisions of the Federal Rules."28
Michael Graham, in his Handbook of Evidence,29 takes this line
of argument a step further and applies it to factual allegations. After
acknowledging that amended pleadings and pleadings from prior
lawsuits ought to .be admissible, Graham makes the following obser-
vation regarding alternative or hypothetical pleadings:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) permits a pleader who is in doubt as to which
of two or more statements of fact is true to plead them alternatively
or hypothetically, regardless of consistency. When this is done, an
admission in one alternative in the pleadings in the case does not
nullify a denial in another as a matter of pleading. Since the pur-
pose of alternative pleading is to enable a party to meet the uncer-
tainties of proof, policy considerations demand that alternative
pleadings not be admitted either as an admission of a party-
opponent or for the purpose of impeachment. 0
Graham, however, offers no explanation for why "enabl[ing] a
party to meet the uncertainties of proof" through alternative or hypo-
thetical pleading requires the exclusion from evidence of factual alle-
gations contained in such pleadings. What "policy considerations"
demand such exclusion?
26. 872 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1989).
27. Id at 313.
28. Id at 314 (quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294, 1298-99 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
29. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.26 (3d ed.
1991).
30. Id
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John Mansfield suggests two such considerations.3 First, the po-
tential admissibility of inconsistent factual allegations might deter
parties from being specific:
A pleader, conscious that his pleadings can be used against him,
may take care to keep his allegations as general as possible in order
to minimize their probative value. If allegations are kept very gen-
eral, they may be less useful in providing notice to the opponent of
the matters in respect to which he will need to be ready with evi-
dence.32
Second, Mansfield suggests that the admission of pleading statements
may cause parties to forego meritorious claims:
[T]he more important point perhaps is that the admissibility of
pleadings against the pleader may affect a party's readiness to
plead at all on certain issues and to put before a tribunal for deter-
mination, possibly in his favor, contentions in respect to which he
does have a reasonable factual basis.33
D. Third Party Pleadings
In the context of multi-party litigation, the admissibility of
amended, prior, or alternative pleadings is particularly controversial.
Courts have frequently excluded pleadings directed towards parties
other than the party seeking to make use of the statement. One such
situation is that of a third party complaint stating a claim of contin-
gent liability, where the defendant is in effect asserting "there should
be no liability here, but if liability is found, it should rest on the
shoulders of X." An example would be a car manufacturer who has
been sued in strict liability for selling cars with allegedly defective
tires. The manufacturer might well make a third party claim of con-
tingent liability against the tire manufacturer. In doing so, a party
will hypothetically allege his or her own liability. Courts have pre-
cluded opponents from introducing such allegations.34
31. See John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 695 (1992).
32. Id.at7ll.
33. Id. at 711-12.
34. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971)
("[A]s a necessary exception to the general rule, there is ample authority that one of two
inconsistent pleas cannot be used as evidence in the trial of the other. It would seem that
this principle would also include inconsistent positions taken in pleadings in a complicated
joinder situation, involving, as here, the contingent liability of third parties.").
[Vol. 49
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However, the exclusion of third party pleadings has not been
limited to cases involving contingent liability. For example, the Su-
preme Court of Kansas in Lytle v. Stearns,35 a straightforward negli-
gence action, took a similar position. There, a defendant ambulance
company had introduced allegations made by the plaintiff in plead-
ings against defendants no longer in the case. The court found error
in the admission of those since-dismissed pleadings.36
Not all courts, however, have agreed that litigants should be pre-
cluded from introducing pleadings directed towards third parties.37
According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, "[while] inconsistent
pleading is permitted, it would be an abuse of such permission for the
plaintiff to make an assertion in a complaint that he does not rea-
sonably believe to be the truth."3 This rationale is employed by
those courts that do admit third party pleadings and is straightfor-
ward. As I argue below, it ought to be applied more generally to
pleadings of all sorts.
H. The Complementary Roles of Procedure and Evidence
I reject the claim that deference to the procedure rules should
cast doubt on the admissibility of factual statements contained in
pleadings, whether alternative, hypothetical, or otherwise. I ac-
knowledge that there are circumstances under which the Federal
Rules of Evidence properly exclude party statements as a matter of
policy in order to protect or facilitate litigation. For example, settle-
ment offers are excluded in order to encourage the resolution of dis-
35. 830 P.2d 1197 (Kan. 1992).
36. The potential for unfairness in Lytle was highlighted by the fact that the very de-
fendant who made use of the pleadings had compelled the joinder of the third parties
against whom those pleadings had been filed. See id. at 1208.
37. See Jelleff v. Braden, 233 F.2d 671, 675-77 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding it proper to
admit complaint seeking indemnity where retailer claimed manufacturer's garment was
flammable); see also Haynes v. Manning, 717 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D. Kan. 1989) (citing
Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1959), which held that admissions in
pleadings are admissible, stating that it is not "significant that the representation was
made in litigation of a third party") ("In addition, evidence that plaintiffs had asserted
claims against other car dealers was admissible because of the abandoned pleadings doc-
trine. Under this doctrine, earlier abandoned pleadings are admissible evidence as admis-
sions by the plaintiffs.").
38. Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 492 A.2d 164 (Conn. 1985) (holding that admission of
plaintiff's since withdrawn complaint against defendant Upjohn on the request of defen-
dant doctor was not reversible error in medical malpractice action).
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putes prior to trial.39 There, it is recognized that parties would be de-
terred from making honest, but potentially damaging, statements that
would facilitate settlement. The question is whether factual state-
ments made in pleadings require the same sort of protection. I argue
that the difficulty posed by a liberal pleading regime is not that par-
ties will be deterred from speaking, but that they will speak too read-
ily. Rather than protecting liberal pleading out of concern for the
litigation process, perhaps we need to protect the full and fair func-
tioning of the litigation process from the risks inherent in liberal
pleading. My argument in a nutshell is as follows.
Legal conclusions or assertions of legal theories may give rise to
confusion or prejudice because parties are required to use particular
terms of art with technical or legal meanings which neither parties
nor fact finders may fully understand. Factual allegations are differ-
ent. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to assert in
pleadings no more than is necessary to give notice of claims and de-
fense. Specifically, litigants are not obligated to make detailed fac-
tual allegations until they have had a chance to conduct discovery.
Moreover, parties are not bound by specific formal or technical re-
quirements and are encouraged to use plain language. In short, par-
ties are permitted to say precisely what they mean and are not re-
quired to say more. In addition, pleadings are generally thought to
be, or at least ought to be, the product of substantial conscious
thought, and are expressly subject to the candor requirements of
Rule 11. These characteristics of the pleading regime-freedom of
expression, opportunity for deliberation, and an awareness of an ob-
ligation to be truthful-make it more, not less, fair to permit, if not
require, parties to be confronted with and to explain their own state-
ments.
The freedom allowed for by the liberal pleading rules not only
makes it fair to permit parties to be confronted with factual state-
ments in their own pleadings, but also almost demands such confron-
tation. As commentators have recognized since before the enact-
ment of the Federal Rules Civil Procedure, the major potential
difficulty with unconstrained pleading is that parties might use that
leeway to interpose baseless allegations, file pleadings intended to
harass adversaries, or cause delay. While this difficulty is addressed
in part by Rule 11, Rule 11 has yet to prove a sufficient protection
39. See FED. R. EVID. 408; see also FED. R. EVID. 409 (excluding offers to pay medi-
cal expenses).
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against pleading abuses, despite periodic amendments. Accordingly,
we must rely on the adversarial process with respect to pleading just
as we do with respect to our system of justice generally. The parties
themselves are our best line of defense against the abuse of liberal
pleading rules. The way they offer that defense is through the well
established principle currently embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) which states that a party's own statements may be used as
evidence against it. Make what factual allegations you choose, says
our pleading system, but keep in mind that you may be asked to ex-
plain them, says the party admissions doctrine.
Granted, the distinction between law and fact, however familiar,
is notoriously difficult to draw with precision. Many statements con-
tained in pleadings will inhabit that substantial grey area between the
categories. Factual allegations and legal conclusions will be inter-
mingled. When this is the case, and factual statements cannot be sev-
ered from statements of legal theories or legal conclusions, courts
need not engage in formalistic hair splitting. Instead, the question of
admissibility should turn on the underlying concerns which render
the law/fact distinction an appropriate criterion. Does the statement
have a technical legal significance which the fact-finder, or the party,
might not be able to appreciate fully? If so, it might be unfairly
prejudicial to require a party to explain that statement at trial. In an-
swering this question, however, courts should be careful to distin-
guish unfair prejudice of the sort that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is
designed to prevent, from the fair and appropriate discomfort experi-
enced by litigants forced to explain their own ill-considered or ques-
tionably-motivated assertions.
A. Rule 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that pleadings
need not contain detailed factual assertions, but need only contain: 1)
an appropriate jurisdictional allegation; 2) "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;" and
3) "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks."'  Rule
8(e)(2), the specific provision which provides the basis for hypotheti-
cal and alternative pleading, is relatively concise and worth quoting
in full:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
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alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are
made in the alternative and one of them if made independently
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the in-
sufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party
may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has re-
gardless of consistency and whether based on legal, equitable, or
maritime grounds. All statements shall be made subject to the ob-
ligations set forth in Rule 11. 4 1
At bottom, the purpose and effect of Rule 8 is to reduce the sig-
nificance of pleading-to shift the focus of litigation from artful
pleading to a full and fair determination of the merits. The rule ac-
complishes this end in at least two related ways. First, it relieves par-
ties of the obligation to assert any more than is necessary to give no-
tice to the opposing party and to provide a framework and starting
point for the litigation. Second, it allows parties to state claims and
defenses, and make factual assertions, in plain and straightforward
language. Parties are neither limited to narrowly specified causes of
action nor bound by technical requirements of form and structure.
These provisions free parties from the need to elect specific legal
theories or make detailed factual allegations before they have had a
chance to acquire the information necessary to do so accurately and
thoughtfully.42
Initially, what this procedural framework means is that parties
who make detailed factual allegations in pleadings do so largely as a
matter of choice. Granted, few litigants, and few plaintiffs in par-
ticular, take advantage of the invitation contained in Rule 8 to file a
"short and plain statement." Extensive, fact-filled complaints are
common. For the purpose of advocacy, plaintiffs choose this ap-
proach in an effort to frame the case before the court in the fullest
and most favorable light.43 Once a party has chosen, for strategic rea-
sons, to say more than necessary, it hardly seems unfair to require
that party to explain those statements at trial.44
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
42. These ends are also served by liberal discovery provisions and by the provisions
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which allow parties to amend pleadings as informa-
tion becomes available.
43. Parties may also include extensive factual allegations for less legitimate ends.
For example, parties may engage in what is sometimes known pejoratively as "shotgun
pleading," whereby one makes as many allegations as possible in the hope that something
will hit home.
44. By contrast, where parties are required to make specific allegations before they
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For our purposes, however, the essential novelty of the liberal
pleading regime inaugurated by the Federal Rules is the availability
of alternative or hypothetical pleading, not only as to alternative legal
theories, but also as to alternative or inconsistent factual allegations.
The intersection of alternative and hypothetical pleading with the
party admissions doctrine is perhaps best illustrated by the Eighth
Circuit case of Garman v. Griffin.' There, an eleven-year-old Mis-
souri boy had been run over and killed by a school bus, and his par-
ents, as plaintiffs, sued the driver, alleging that he had failed to keep
a proper lookout.' On the eve of the statutory limitations period,
the plaintiffs also sought to take advantage of Missouri's recently
recognized doctrine of strict liability. 7 They brought a claim in strict
liability against Superior Bus Sales, Inc., alleging that the bus "was so
constructed and its mirrors so positioned that a full and complete
view of the area within the path of the bus was not discernable by a
person positioned in the driver's seat."48 Prior to trial, however, the
plaintiffs learned that they had sued the wrong bus company.49 Supe-
rior Bus Sales, Inc. had neither manufactured nor sold the bus in
question." The plaintiffs then dismissed that claim and proceeded
against the bus driver."1
At trial, the defendant driver was permitted to introduce the
above-quoted portions of the plaintiffs' since-dismissed complaint. 2
The Eighth Circuit found reversible error.5 The court acknowledged
that factual statements contained in pleadings are often admissible,
but drew distinctions based on whose conduct those statements con-
cern:
have had an opportunity to conduct discovery, as is the case with claims of fraud under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the possibility of unfairness or prejudice through
the subsequent introduction of those allegations increases. This risk is particularly salient
in areas such as securities fraud litigation and antitrust conspiracy litigation where com-
mon law pleading requirements have extended and broadened the requirements of Rule
9(b) and have, thus, introduced a counter-current to the notice-pleading regime of the
Rules generally. See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
45. 666 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1981).
46. See id. at 1157.
47. See id. at 1158.
48. Id. at 1157.
49. See id. at 1158.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1157.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1160.
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When factual allegations in the pleading relate to the conduct of
the same defendant who is offering the evidence, the evidence is
generally admitted, even though the particular pleading has been
abandoned or dismissed. Where a party has made a statement in a
pleading about his own conduct which is at variance with his posi-
tion in the matter being litigated, the evidence is generally admit-
ted.54
The court held, however, that pleadings which relate solely to
the conduct of parties no longer in the case should not be admissi-
ble." According to the court:
The use of pleading admissions in situations akin to the case under
submission seems to us to be contrary to the spirit of the Federal
Rules. Furthermore, it simply does not seem quite fair to these
plaintiffs. A pleader in the Federal Courts should not have to forgo
a potential claim rather than run the risk of having such a claim
used as an admission.56
In his vigorous dissent, Judge Arnold argued not only that the
court's holding was inconsistent with prior precedent, but also that
the case was wrongly decided on its own terms.5 According to Judge
Arnold, an allegation that the mirrors precluded the driver from
seeing the child "most certainly concerns the driver's conduct., 58 The
dissent further maintained that admitting factual statements of this
sort did not infringe on the right to plead in the alternative, and that
the question of undue prejudice should be left to the discretion of the
trial court under Federal Rule of Evidence 403."9
Garman thus provides a context in which to evaluate the law/fact
distinction. Did the admission of that pleading by the trial court rep-
resent an unfair imposition on the plaintiffs' right to plead hypotheti-
cally or in the alternative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(e)? This is the heart of the matter, and it turns on an interpretation
of the "rights" bestowed by Rule 8(e). What, precisely, are the lib-
eral pleading provisions in the Federal Rules designed to permit?
It is perhaps most important to be explicit about what the rules
do not permit. Specifically, Rule 8(e), and the regime of liberal
pleading ushered in by the Federal Rules generally, do not allow par-
54. Id. at 1158 (citations omitted).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 1160.
56. See id.
58. Id. at 1162 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
59. See id.
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ties to make factual allegations which they do not reasonably believe
to be true. Any doubt on this point is eliminated by the explicit ref-
erence in Rule 8(e) to Rule 11.' Rule 11 does not permit a party to
make an allegation which he or she merely has no reason to believe is
false on the chance that discovery will provide some support. While a
denial may be based on "a lack of information or belief,"'" an af-
firmative allegation requires more. A party must at least have reason
to believe that factual allegations "are likely to have evidentiary sup-
port."'62 One might attempt a pinched and formalistic reading of the
phrase "evidentiary support" and argue that the obligations of Rule
11(b)(3) are met by a party's reasonable belief that, by the time of
trial, he or she is likely to be able to find someone willing to perjure
himself in support of the allegation in question. The only reasonable
interpretation, however, is that a party, before making an allegation,
must have some reason to believe that it might actually be true.
This interpretation is borne out when one contrasts our modern
pleading regime with the common law and code pleading systems it
replaced and when one considers the concerns which motivated and
accompanied the drafting and passage of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under the common law and code pleading systems in
existence prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, provisions var-
ied, and courts were less than completely consistent, but certain
pleading requirements were emblematic. First, pleaders were subject
60. The relevant portions of Rule 11, in its current formulation, provide:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion,
or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, -
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
61. FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(4).
62. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(b)(3).
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to numerous and varied formal requirements. Although the highly
restrictive pleading forms of an earlier era had been liberalized to a
substantial extent by the turn of the century, a claim could still be
subject to dismissal if it did not fit squarely within a recognized cause
of action. Second, alternative or hypothetical pleading was generally
not permitted.63 Claims and defenses were required to be affirma-
tively stated and mutually consistent. 4 The aim was to provide cer-
tainty in pleadings so that parties would know precisely what claims
they were confronting.65 Some courts held that a "party may plead in
the alternative, but that if he does so, he will be made to adopt and
stand by the weakest of the alternatives."'
Courts in the early part of the century began to recognize that
this system often forced a premature choice of legal theories. In
1928, Charles Clark, who was to play a substantial role in drafting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enacted a decade later, noted a ten-
dency on the part of courts to enforce the consistency requirement
less strictly.67 He went on to question the value of the requirement
itself:
It is doubtful if the rule [requiring consistency of legal theories as
well as factual allegations] achieves any practically desirable result.
At most it is only an attempt to compel the pleader to be truthful,
which is better achieved, so far as it can be done, by a summary mo-
tion to strike the pleading as false. 68
In place of the consistency rule used in most jurisdictions at the
time, Clark advocated allowing parties to state as many claims or de-
fenses as they could, so long as those claims or defenses were truth-
ful. Regarding defendants, for example, Clark argued that "[tlhe de-
fendant should be entitled to rely upon as many different defenses as
he honestly has."69 The single limitation Clark proposed was "that
we ought to enforce [a requirement] against [the pleader] ... that he
be as truthful as his knowledge of the circumstances will permit."'7
63. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1282 (1990).
64. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CODE PLEADING (1928).
65. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 63, at § 1282.
66. Gregory Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings, 33 YALE L.J. 365, 374
(1924).
67. See CLARK, supra note 64, at 432.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 434.
70. Id.
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This approach, including its emphasis on allowing freedom in plead-
ing while enforcing a requirement of candor, carried over into Clark's
work on the Federal Rules.
Given the explicit reference in Rule 8(e) to Rule 11,71 and given
the history and context of the development of the Federal Rules, the
right to plead hypothetically or in the alternative cannot be inter-
preted as a privilege to make false or baseless claims. On the other
hand, one possible reading of Rule 11 may suggest an internal incon-
sistency in the procedural rules. If we read the Rule 11 requirement
that allegations must be "likely to have evidentiary support" as
meaning that the allegations must be "probably true," we have a
problem. That is, Rule 11 would seem to preclude what Rule 8(e)
expressly permits. Afterall, how can one reasonably believe in the
truth of two logically inconsistent factual assertions? Rule 11, in its
current formulation, provides a resolution. While a party cannot rea-
sonably believe that two inconsistent statements are both actually
true, a party can reasonably believe that either of two inconsistent
allegations might be true. One can be honestly uncertain. The dis-
tinction may seem fine, but it is vital and is highlighted by Rule 11 it-
self. Rule 11(b)(3) makes clear that if a party is asserting the latter-
that he or she has reason to believe that an allegation might be true
but presently lacks sufficient information to be sure-the allegation
must be "specifically so identified."'
In essence, this is what it means to plead alternatively or hypo-
thetically but not falsely or without basis in fact. Rule 8(e) tells
plaintiffs that a lack of certainty regarding specific details should not
preclude them from bringing the claims which will afford them the
discovery opportunities necessary to uncover the facts. The same
rule tells defendants that a lack of certainty regarding details should
not prevent them from asserting defenses necessary to protect their
rights while they pursue discovery of their own. Rule 11 then clari-
fies. Parties must at least have some basis for believing the claims
and defenses they assert, and, equally important, they must not pre-
tend to have more certainty with respect to their claims than they ac-
tually possess. Together, the rules permit parties to be honestly un-
certain, but not dishonestly certain.
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(3).
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B. Legal Theories
This understanding of the pleading rules suggests that pleadings,
which must always have some basis in fact or honest uncertainty,
should be excluded from evidence where circumstances suggest that
the party against whom the pleadings are offered will be unfairly
prejudiced, as opposed to fairly and legitimately called upon to ex-
plain his or her own statements. Unfair prejudice of this sort is most
likely to exist where an opponent seeks to make use of an allegation
containing technical, legal terminology with a precise meaning or le-
gal significance that might not be appreciated by the fact-finder. A
paradigmatic example is the third party contingent liability claim in
which a party hypothetically asserts his or her own liability. Since
that party never intended to assert that he or she is actually liable, he
or she can neither be fairly impeached for a willingness to make
baseless claims nor fairly construed as offering substantive support
for the facts at issue. The only use for such an allegation is a prejudi-
cial use-an attempt by the opponent to take advantage of the fact-
finder's potential inability to appreciate the special, limited legal sig-
nificance of contingent allegations.
A similar situation arises when alternative or inconsistent legal
theories are phrased in ways which make them look like inconsistent
factual assertions. For example, a contract plaintiff might allege in
separate counts that: 1) the parties had a contract which the defen-
dant has breached; and 2) because of fraud in the inducement, no
valid contract existed. Legal allegations of this sort are best under-
stood as announcements of an intention on the part of the pleader to
pursue a particular form of claim or defense. Thus, the allegation
"because of fraud in the inducement, no valid contract existed,"
should be read as "one of the legal theories under which the facts of
this case entitle this party to recover is that which the law of contracts
knows as fraud in the inducement." As one commentator has ob-
served, "pleadings of this nature are directed primarily to giving no-
tice and lack the essential character of an admission.,
73
The fact/law distinction in this context is thus neither formal nor
technical, but rather substantive and functional. Factual assertions
and legal allegations play distinct roles in the adversarial process. A
party is permitted to make inconsistent factual allegations so that he
or she can gain access to the discovery necessary to learn what the
73. STRONG, supra note 8, at § 257.
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facts really are. As a result, by the time of the trial, the party can
fairly be asked to report what has been learned. The fact-finder de-
serves to know why one allegation rather than another should be be-
lieved. Inconsistent legal allegations, however, serve a different end.
They assert not that the state of the world is "X" or "Y," but that a
given state of the world should be understood as fitting within the le-
gal definition "X" or "Y." Not only might juries find it difficult to
appreciate this distinction, but parties themselves will be hard
pressed to explain it. As observed by the Supreme Court of Kansas,
"clients are rarely in a position to explain the legal theories and
strategies chosen by their attorney."'74
Moreover, the fact-finder is not asked to decide what legal theo-
ries might appropriately be applied to a given set of facts. Therefore,
when a jury is presented with a legal allegation which sounds like a
factual assertion--e.g., "there was no contract"-they can only be
expected to put it to work in the task they have been given, deter-
mining the facts. They can make use of a legal assertion only by mis-
understanding it as an assertion about the state of the world. The
conclusions they draw from this misunderstanding, whether regarding
the credibility of the party or the facts of the case, are thus improper
and potentially prejudicial. In this sense, the exclusion of legal alle-
gations under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is necessary not to pro-
tect the freedom of expression provided for by liberal pleading rules,
but rather because that freedom is not, and can never be, complete.
While factual assertions can be stated in plain language, legal conclu-
sions are by nature formal or technical. Parties are forced to use par-
ticular terms of art, despite the potential for confusion or prejudice,
so that the court can perform its role of fitting facts into the formal
framework of the law.75
C. Factual Allegations
A party who has conformed with Rule 11, as incorporated into
74. Lytle v. Stearns, 830 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Kan. 1992) (emphasis added).
75. Recognizing the significance of the roles played by the court and the fact finder
suggests an alternative method of excluding legal conclusions contained in pleadings.
Courts could apply the general bar against testimony stating legal conclusions to party
admissions. Given, however, that most of the limitations placed on witness testimony are
not applicable to party admissions, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides a more satis-
factory and doctrinally consistent foundation upon which to ground the law/fact distinc-
tion in this context.
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Rule 8(e), will almost never face undue prejudice when confronted at
trial with the factual allegations contained in his or her own plead-
ings. Put differently, the potential introduction of factual allegations
contained in pleadings will almost never burden the legitimate exer-
cise of alternative or hypothetical pleading under Rule 8(e). The par-
ties with most reason to fear being confronted with their own plead-
ings are those who have misused the liberal pleading rules by
introducing baseless claims or by pretending to have a level of cer-
tainty they did not possess.
One way to test this claim is to ask whether one can envision a
set of circumstances under which a party would be dissuaded from
making a legitimate and necessary hypothetical or alternative factual
allegation out of fear of being confronted with that allegation at trial.
I should be explicit about the scope of my claim. By "legitimate," I
mean in conformity with Rule 11(b). By "necessary," I mean needed
in order to state a claim or defense while pursuing the discovery that
the party requires in order to proceed with certainty. If a party can
state a claim or assert a defense and gain access to discovery without
making a specific, yet unsupported factual allegation, there is little
reason to compromise a longstanding principle of evidence law in an
effort to protect that party's right to make that specific allegation
prematurely.
In this context, I do not share John Mansfield's concern over the
possibility that the potential introduction of pleadings might deter
parties from being as specific as possible.76 The very purpose of a lib-
eral notice-pleading regime is to defer specificity until after discovery
when parties have had an opportunity to gather information. We
forego some certainty in the opening phases of litigation in favor of
rationality and fairness in the process as a whole. The absence of an
obligation to be prematurely specific also means that Mansfield's
more serious concern-that parties may forego legitimate claims77-
is misplaced. We need not fear that the admissibility of factual allega-
tions contained in pleadings will deter parties from pursuing merito-
rious claims because parties need make so few such allegations in or-
der to preserve those claims.
In Garman v. Griffin, recall that the defense counsel introduced
plaintiffs' withdrawn allegation that the mirrors on the bus were "so
positioned that a full and complete view of the area within the path of
76. See Mansfield, supra note 31, at 711.
77. See id. at 711-12.
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the bus was not discernable by a person positioned in the driver's
seat."78 Note that plaintiffs arguably need not have been this specific
to state a claim and obtain discovery. Note also that, if this complaint
were filed today under the post-1993 version of Rule 11, assuming
that plaintiffs had not inspected the bus or conducted any significant
investigation prior to filing the complaint, some form of qualifier
along the lines of "subject to further investigation" would arguably
be required.79 Even given that they failed to qualify their allegations,
however, no undue prejudice needed accompany the introduction of
that pleading by the defendant bus driver at trial.
Consider defense counsel's goals in introducing the pleading.
The aim was either to gain substantive support for the defense's the-
ory that poorly positioned mirrors caused the accident, or to impeach
the plaintiffs by showing that they are willing to say anything in an ef-
fort to recover damages. Plaintiff's counsel, however, should have
been able to insure that neither end was met. Consider the following
hypothetical re-direct examination:
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL (ON RE-DIRECT): Ms. Garman, de-
fense counsel read a statement to the effect that defective mirrors
were the cause of this accident, do you recall that?
MS. GARMAN: Yes I do.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Did you at any time have reason to
believe that might be the case-that defective mirrors were the real
cause of the accident?
MS. GARMAN: I did. That's what the driver told the police. He
told the police that he couldn't get a full view. [Or whatever reason
there was for believing that the bus might actually be defective.]
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Do you now believe that was true-
that the defective position of the mirrors caused the accident?
MS. GARMAN: No, I do not. It turns out there was nothing
wrong with the mirrors. That's why I'm suing the driver and not the
bus company.
Plaintiffs would hardly have been prejudiced by this exchange.
More to the point, it is hard to imagine that the possibility of this sort
of exchange would dissuade them from making their initial allegation
against the bus company, assuming they had some reason to believe
78. 666 F.2d 1156, 1157 (8th Cir. 1981).
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11(b)(3) requires that factual allegations likely to
have evidenciary support only after further investigation must be "specifically so identi-
fied." FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(3).
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that the bus might actually have been defective.
The parties who will be disconcerted by the introduction of the
factual statements in their own pleadings are those who have diffi-
culty answering the two key questions put to Ms. Garman in this hy-
pothetical re-direct. If a party did not have a reason to believe that
the assertion in question might actually be true, then that party will
appear before the fact-finder as one who is willing to make baseless
allegations. Given that Rule 8(e) does not permit parties to violate
Rule 11 in this fashion, this use of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) does not constitute unfair prejudice but legitimate im-
peachment. Alternatively, if the party did have some basis for be-
lieving that the assertion might be true, it is relevant as substantive
proof of what it asserts.
The plaintiffs in Garman, while no doubt damaged by the intro-
duction of the statement, were not unfairly prejudiced. Although the
opinion does not give a complete sense of the courtroom dynamic,
one of two things must have been true. Either the plaintiffs' allega-
tion conformed with Rule 11 or it did not. If the plaintiffs had no le-
gitimate basis for believing that the mirrors on the bus were posi-
tioned as they claimed, then they were caught in a violation of Rule
11 and were legitimately impeached for their willingness to file a
baseless claim. If, on the other hand, the plaintiffs did have some
reason for believing that the bus provided the driver with an inade-
quate view, then the defendant was well within his rights to introduce
that statement for whatever it was worth as substantive evidence of
the fact.
The court makes much of the fact that the plaintiffs filed their
claim against the bus company at the eleventh hour in an effort to
beat the limitations period. ° This suggests a potentially troubling
consequence of admitting all factual statements. What of plaintiffs
who, like those in Garman, appear to have been forced to make alle-
gations before they have any opportunity at all to conduct an investi-
gation? Might not such parties be unfairly burdened by the introduc-
tion of such statements? Might they not be unfairly inhibited, by the
anticipation of such introduction, from exercising their rights under
Rule 8(e) to file claims necessary to preserve their rights?
Initially, I acknowledge that prejudice might arise through the
introduction of a statement which a party was truly forced to make, in
the sense that the statement was involuntary, or never intended as an
79. See Garman, 666 F.2d at 1158.
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assertion." For example, were an attorney 'to act in bad faith and
make a statement against his or her own client's wishes, it could be
prejudicial to require the client to explain that statement at trial.
Plaintiffs in the position of those in Garman, however, are not
"forced" to make factual allegations. Granted, if the Garman plain-
tiffs had not made the allegation prior to the expiration of the limita-
tions period, they would have lost the ability to do so. This is as it
should be. The purpose of limitations statutes is to provide repose to
potential defendants by putting potential plaintiffs in this very posi-
tion. What a limitations statute says to potential plaintiffs, in con-
junction with Rule 11, is the following: If, by the end of the allotted
time period, you do not have a reasonable basis for believing that a
given potential defendant might actually be liable, you cannot sue
that potential defendant. In short, Rule 11 does not permit a party to
toll a limitations statute by filing a baseless claim or making baseless
factual allegations.
To the extent that the allegations at issue in Garman did have
some basis in fact and, thus, did not violate Rule 11, the defendant
may have been seeking not to impeach the plaintiffs but rather to use
their statements to bolster his own defense. The plaintiffs in Garman
may well have been unable to counter this substantive use of their
own statement because they had no good reason for retracting it.
They had a reason for withdrawing the pleading-the dismissal of the
claim-but evidently had no explanation for why their former state-
ment should be disregarded. They withdrew the claim not because
they had acquired additional information suggesting the allegations
concerning the mirror were incorrect, but because they had sued the
wrong defendant. They retracted the allegation not because it
proved wrong, but because it proved unnecessary and inconvenient.
Also, the possibility that an opponent could make legitimate
substantive use of a party's statement in this way is apparently dis-
missed or overlooked by those courts which hold that factual state-
ments contained in prior or withdrawn pleadings should be admitted
only when they are inconsistent with positions taken by the pleader at
trial.8 2 By focusing solely on the impeachment value of inconsistent
factual pleadings, these courts appear to reject the possibility that
81. As noted, one of the reasons legal allegations are potentially prejudicial is that
parties are forced to use specific words and phrases despite the potential for confusion or
prejudice.
82 See, e.g., Spinosa v. Int'l Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1980).
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such pleadings might be relevant simply as proof of what they as-
sert.83 Underlying this approach may be a sense that it is somehow
unfair or prejudicial to allow a party's own allegations to be used
against him or her in this fashion. This paternalism, however, runs
counter to the autonomy and free expression concerns which form
the basis for the party admissions doctrine.
Conclusion
One might draw an analogy between the freedom of pleading
provided by the procedure rules and the freedom of speech protected
by the First Amendment. We do not consider it an infringement on
the First Amendment when an individual is confronted with or forced
to explain his or her statements. Nor do we worry that freedom of
the press might be inhibited by journalists' knowledge that some of
what they say may ultimately provide support for positions other
than their own. To the contrary, it is in these ways that freedom of
the press produces its finest benefits to society. Without making any
attempt to rehearse the case for free speech, we can recognize the ex-
tent to which the benefits of free expression flow from vigorous de-
bate between citizens, each of whom is likely to have valuable but
partial information and insights. We rely on adversaries to make use
of, and put into context, information provided by those with whom
they debate. We hope that participants in public discourse will not
abuse the right of free expression, but we recognize the likely ineffi-
cacy of rule-based attempts to control speech. Short of defamation,
Rule 11 has no counterpart in the court of public opinion. Thus, it is
not only fair, but it is vital, that citizens be permitted and encouraged
to keep one another honest.
What is true of the broader marketplace of ideas applies as well
to a regime of civil justice that has chosen to apply the market princi-
ple to the resolution of disputes. If the adversarial process is to func-
tion as a method of fact-finding, parties must be free to speak. But
with that freedom comes the potential for abuse. While Rule 11
might be more palatable than would be an attempt to codify and en-
force speech regulations outside the sphere of litigation, we cannot
83. It is worth noting that impeachment, as a non-hearsay use of statements, would
be permissible even absent Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) so long as the party testi-
fies at trial. A hearsay exclusion is necessary only where parties seek to offer out of court
statements as proof of what they assert. Rule 801(d)(2), if it is to apply, must be seen as
allowing substantive use.
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rely on courts with limited resources to enforce the obligations of
candor and legitimate motives codified in that rule. Rule 11 lays
down the law, but the parties themselves must be trusted to enforce
it.
One potentially troubling aspect of allowing the introduction of
pleadings in aid of this enforcement is that many clients may have no
idea why their pleadings contain, or did contain prior to amendment,
certain factual allegations. The admission of pleadings seems to
punish clients for the sins of their lawyers. At one level, this is a
more general, and largely unavoidable, consequence of any system in
which people act through agents. Where people speak, act, and hope
to benefit through agents, they can hardly be permitted to disclaim at
will their agents' words and actions.' More fundamentally, however,
it may be the case that not all lawyers are created equal and that
some people can afford more expert representation. In this light, it
might be desirable to reduce the extent to which outcomes are de-
termined by differences in lawyering skills. This is precisely the pur-
pose of the pleading rules.
Recall that Rule 8, in particular, is intended to make civil litiga-
tion less of a technical chess match and more of a forum for the fair
and open resolution of disputes. It does so by relegating pleading to
the function of notice-giving and issue-framing. Deserving litigants
should not be defeated by superior tacticians before they have had a
chance to investigate and build a case. Outcomes should be deter-
mined by an open adversarial process, rather than by a contest of art-
ful pleading. We gain little, however, if the gamesmanship of techni-
cal pleading is merely replaced by a new game-a game of
harassment, delay, or shotgun pleading. Our liberal pleading regime,
combined with the party admissions doctrine, represents a decision to
allow the adversarial process to deal with this problem. We forego
the dubious protections of technical pleading requirements in favor
84. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 82 S.Ct. 1386,1390 (1962).
There is certainly no merit to the claim that dismissal of petitioner's claim be-
cause of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client.
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in this action, and
he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely se-
lected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of
representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his
lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which can
be charged upon the attorney."
Ia (citations omitted).
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of the heartier discipline of the marketplace. Parties are trusted not
only to ferret out baseless claims, but also to deter and sanction
abuses by holding their adversaries accountable for what they have
said and done. It would be ironic if Rule 8, by providing a rationale
for excluding party admissions set forth in pleadings and for limiting
the ability of litigants to keep each other honest as a result, were to
serve as a shield for the gamesmanship it aims to prevent.
